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Central and peripheral capitalist countries alike are 
facing the present crisis without having discovered 
how to deal with the fundamental dilemmas of accu-
mulation and distribution, which are clearly evidenced 
in the trend towards an imbalance between the growth 
rate of private and public expenditure and that of 
reproductive investment, and in the difficulty —espe-
cially acute in the periphery— of finding solutions for 
the problems of growth, employment, the external 
bottleneck and inflation. Experience shows, once 
again, that these problems will not be resolved by the 
application of monetarist or Keynesian criteria, which 
means that new principles of macroeconomic regula-
tion must be established. 
After putting forward this thesis in general terms 
(section i), the author turns his attention to the inter-
national propagation of inflation and the role played 
therein by the United States (section n), before going 
on to the core of his analysis, i.e., presenting the causes 
accounting for the aforesaid disequilibrium, which 
pivot upon the appropriation, retention and sharing-
out of the surplus (section in). In the last part (section 
IV) he analyses the incidence of the crisis in the centres 
on the periphery and the specific nature of the prej-
, udicial effects on the latter stemming from structural 
factors and from policy decisions, both external and 
internal. 
The crisis is a matter of economic facts, of the ideas 
in the light of which attempts are made to interpret it, 
and of the policies that seek to cope with it; the 
periphery's only way out of it will be through an auton-
omous effort of intellectual reflection and of political 
action. 





We are witnessing a crisis which in its nature and 
its manifestations outdoes even the severity of 
that of the 1930s. It cannot, in my view, be ex-
plained in the light of theories which emerged in 
the centres over a century ago; neither those that 
exalt the virtues of capitalism nor those that con-
demn the system. 
They are theories that have been left behind 
by events and likewise by the giant strides of 
scientific knowledge. Capitalism has evolved un-
ceasingly and, as technical innovations develop 
and spread, great changes take place in the struc-
ture of society, accompanied by others of major 
significance in the power relations that so strong-
ly influence the tempo of development and the 
social distribution of its fruits. To all this are 
added the increasingly notorious effects of the 
ambivalence of technique. 
The anachronistic character of these 
theories is very serious both in itself and in its 
implications, since they are incapable of inter-
preting the facts and are counterproductive in 
their modes of action. Time and time again real-
ity overbrims the narrow mould of concepts 
which seek to give it a purely economic cast, 
eliminating, by a sort of doctrinaire asepsis, so-
cial, cultural and political elements which form 
an integral part of it and which, together with 
technical and economic factors, are of growing 
importance in the structural mutations of 
society. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that within 
these narrow bounds there is still talk of the 
general equilibrium towards which the system 
tends when it is not subjected to disturbing in-
terventions. In other words, when the so-called 
magic of market laws is respected. 
There is no such thing as a tendency towards 
general equilibrium. Quite the contrary: the 
evolution of the system makes for structural dise-
quilibria of major significance, both in the cen-
tres and in the periphery, as well as in centre-
periphery relations. 
In the course of more than three decades I 
think I have got to the bottom of the explanation 
of this trend towards disequilibrium between the 
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centres and the Latin American region of the 
periphery. I have tried to demonstrate the se-
rious theoretical errors stemming from the cen-
tres and from their mistaken attitude towards 
our phenomena. And I have likewise gone deep-
ly into the tendencies towards internal disequilib-
rium within the periphery itself, whence new 
forms of inflation have been arising. 
I have reached the conclusion that in the 
centres too the trend towards internal disequilib-
rium is becoming more and more marked: a 
disequilibrium between the growth rate of pri-
vate and public expenditure and that of the re-
productive investment which increases employ-
ment and productivity, and without which ex-
penditure cannot evolve along progressive lines. 
From this imbalance also emanate the problems 
of inflation in the centres. Accordingly, to our 
peripheral countries can be ascribed the doubt-
ful merit of having been the forerunners of this 
inflation deriving from dynamic disequilibrium. 
Be that as it may, it is a matter for consterna-
tion that the weapon consistently used to attack 
these problems should be the monetary instru-
ment. Highly efficacious in the past as a means of 
correcting the inflationary deviations of the sys-
tem, it has now become counterproductive in 
face of the new social forces that are accompany-
ing structural change. The question is no longer 
one of deviations, but of a struggle for redistribu-
tion in which the aim of the labour force —if I 
may be allowed to use this concept in a very broad 
sense— is to increase its participation in the 
growing productivity of the system, both direct-
ly, and through the social services provided by 
the State. Moreover, the tendency of the State is 
to share out the productivity increment more 
and more. 
Thus consumer expenditure is continually 
mounting. To the conspicuous consumption of 
the social strata advantaged by their dispro-
portionate share in the fruits of technical prog-
ress, are added not only the growing consump-
tion of private and social goods and services on 
the part of the labour force, but also State spend-
ing, both civil and military. However, the dif-
ferent forms of expenditure do not show in-
creases in some cases to the detriment of others, 
but are superimposed upon one another. And 
inevitably their rate of growth tends to outstrip 
that of reproductive capital accumulation. 
Given the prevailing system, the monetarist 
instrument is the only one available to attack the 
inflation deriving from this dynamic disequilib-
rium. But it is no longer a fitting one; and the 
consequences of its application are disastrous. 
The facts suffice to testify that the social cost is 
enormous. Yet recognition of the impossibility of 
combating this new form of inflation with mone-
tary regulation is slow to dawn. Some other kind 
of macroeconomic regulation is imperatively re-
quired to correct the tendency towards dynamic 
disequilibrium, both in the centres and in the 
periphery. 
T h e concept of economic equilibrium is 
totally out of touch with reality, inasmuch as it 
overlooks the structural phenomenon of the eco-
nomic surplus. I maintain that however fully the 
rule of free market competition be observed, 
only part of the productivity increment 
attributable to technical progress is transferred 
to the labour force, while the rest is appropriated 
and retained as an economic surplus by the 
holders of the means of production, especially 
the upper strata of society where those means are 
concentrated. 
The economic surplus plays a vital role in the 
dynamics of the system, since it is the primordial 
source of reproductive investment such as multi-
plies employment and productivity and con-
tinuously augment the surplus itself. But it is 
also a source of considerable expansion of the 
consumption of the upper strata, increasingly 
stimulated by the techniques for the diversifi-
cation of goods and services which, it is true, also 
tend to step up the consumption of the lower 
strata as the productivity of the system makes 
progress. 
During the past history of capitalism, it has 
been possible for the upper strata to appropriate 
the surplus by virtue of the passiveness of the 
labour force and the laissez-faire attitude of the 
State. 
The surplus is a historical category which is 
based essentially on social inequality; it corre-
sponds to a specific power structure. In the 
course of structural change the labour force pro-
gressively, although very unequally, develops its 
trade-union and political power, and struggles to 
obtain a larger share in the productivity incre-
ment; the State does the same, in order to cover 
both its increasing social expenditure on behalf 
of the labour force and the outlays deriving from 
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its own dynamics, which, in their turn, reflect the 
changes that have occurred in the power struc-
ture. 
In so far as the State, in order to cover the 
social services referred to as well as the expansion 
of other expenditure, resorts to taxation of 
which the burden has to be borne by the labour 
force, the latter tries to recoup itself by means of 
wage increases. This tends to push wages up 
faster than productivity rises, thus weakening 
the growth rate of the surplus and therefore that 
of capital accumulation. 
Some of the taxes also fall on the surplus and 
adversely affect the development of reproduc-
tive investment and, consequently, of productiv-
ity, at least as long as State investment and ex-
penditure do not help to improve matters. 
Thus, as the passiveness of the labour force 
and the laissez-faire policy of the State are mod-
ified, the tendency for wages to increase faster 
than productivity and the slackening of the lat-
ter's rate of growth bring consequences in their 
train that are more and more disturbing, given 
the nature of the system. 
Every rise in wages has the twofold effect of 
raising costs and boosting demand in such a way 
that the higher costs can be transferred to prices 
in so far as the rate of increase of wages rise 
outstrips that of productivity. And hard upon 
this rise in prices follows a fresh wage increase, if 
the labour force has enough power to obtain it. 
This is the origin of the inflationary spiral, deriv-
ing from the pressure of costs and intensified by 
the upswing in rates of interest that succeeds the 
rise in prices. 
The upward movement of prices is really 
due to the endeavours of enterprises to defend 
the appropriation and retention of the surplus. 
And there is no spontaneous mechanism what-
soever whereby the increase in costs can be 
absorbed at the expense of the consumption of 
the groups benefitting by the surplus so as not to 
weaken the rate of accumulation. That is not how 
the system functions. It tries to protect the 
apropriation of the surplus by the groups in 
question where both their consumption and 
their investment are concerned. 
It should be taken into account, however, 
that if the real remunerations of the labour force 
are improved a portion of them may be used for 
accumulation, thus offsetting, to some extent at 
least, the weakening of capital accumulation on 
the part of enterprises. But neither is there any 
mechanism that spontaneously leads to this sort 
of compensation. What is of essential interest to 
enterprises is to defend the surplus and use it 
freely for their own investment rather than to let 
it be drawn upon for accumulation by the labour 
force. The same might be said of accumulation 
by the State. 
It is not so much a question of resolving the 
technical problem of accumulation in order to 
promote the dynamics of the system, as of pre-
serving the appropriation of a large proportion 
of the fruits of technical progress by the owners 
of the means of production. The system's need to 
speed up the rate of accumulation in order to 
increase employment does not represent a re-
sponsability intrinsically incumbent upon the so-
cial groups that appropriate the surplus. It is 
other elements that determine the rate of accu-
mulation, and above all a factor of a cultural 
nature: the degree of austerity of these social 
groups, or, in other words, their resistance 
against the pertinacious incitement to consump-
tion, spurred by the ever-increasing diversifica-
tion of goods and services. Whatever degree of 
austerity may have been practised in the histori-
cal development of capitalism, it must be ac-
knowledged that this is not a characteristic of 
peripheral capitalism. 
Let us now revert to the defence of the sur-
plus through price increases, which causes infla-
tion to spiral when the labour force is no longer 
passive and the monetary authority allows the 
necessary creation of money. The growing dis-
tortions which accompany this amplification of 
the spiral sooner or later induce the monetary 
authority to restrict credit. The consequences are 
common knowledge: a decline or contraction of 
the growth rate together with tighter and tighter 
compression of the surplus and a slump in em-
ployment. 
It is precisely in the decrease in employment 
that the key to this monetary policy lies. For 
sooner or later it leads the labour force to accept 
a deterioration of its real remunerations until the 
wage squeeze permits of a new increase in the 
surplus and in its dynamic role, as well as in the 
consumption of the advantaged social groups. 
Furthermore, a rise in interest rates accentu-
ated by a restrictive monetary policy, implies a 
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substantial transfer of real income from produc-
tive activity (surplus and remuneration of labour 
force) to financial activity, and slows down the 
tempo of economic activity, which then con-
tracts. 
Such, in a few words, is the way in which a 
notable success in curbing inflation has been 
scored, first of all in the main dynamic centre of 
capitalism. In a recent commentary on this fact, 
The Economist1 noted that this result had been 
achieved by squeezing real wages in order to 
increase the profits of enterprises (i.e., to rees-
tablish the surplus). A very laudable thesis, 
according to the periodical —which has gained a 
wide circulation both in the centres and in the 
periphery, and which supports monetary policy 
as a means of combating inflation. Here are the 
terms in which its remarks are couched: 
"Falling real wages, like falling oil prices, are 
correcting an imbalance that has harmed the 
world economy for 10 years. Too-dear oil and 
too-dear labour both helped to cause stagflation. 
Their demise could herald a new age of low 
unemployment and low inflation, especially if 
too-dear money also ended. When that happens, 
the world will enjoy many happy New Years." 
The economic and social cost of a restrictive 
monetary policy is tremendous, as we have 
already pointed out. But according to its defend-
ers, this is a cost that has to be incurred in order 
to restore the system to health: i.e., in order to 
correct what they consider excesses brought 
about by the exaggerated claims of the trade 
unions, as well as by the increasing social benefits 
that contribute to the hypertrophy of what is no 
longer a laissez-faire State. In fact, the neoclassical 
economists generally accept with resignation 
(and not without a measure of complacency in 
some cases) the economic and social cost in ques-
tion for the sake of remedying the consequences 
of the violation of market laws by the labour 
force, as well as by abusive exercise of the power 
of State. 
Violation of market laws, because, according 
to the neoclassical theories, if the market is 
allowed to operate freely, with no interference 
whatsoever, the economic system will tend to-
wards equilibrium. And given this equilibrium, 
workers, entrepreneurs and capital will be re-
'24 December 1983. 
munerated in accordance with their contribution 
to the production process. Whence derives a con-
clusion of supreme importance in neoclassical 
theory (although it is not usually explicitly 
stated): the free play of market forces dissemi-
nates throughout society the fruits of technical 
progress which find expression in the steadily 
rising productivity of the system, when this is left 
to its own devices. 
These arguments, of course, disregard the 
structural phenomenon of the surplus; not only 
does accumulation increase, but so does the pri-
vileged consumption of the social groups that 
benefit by technical progress. It is precisely this 
manifest inequality in consumption that causes 
the twofold pressure for redistribution exerted 
by the labour force and the State. Only the sys-
tem, given its modus operandi, precludes effica-
cious fulfilment of the design of equitable dis-
tribution. 
Let some thought be given to the significance 
of these facts. The labour force finds itself com-
pelled to accept a compression of its real wages so 
that the system may recover its capacity for accu-
mulation. And for that to happen, unemploy-
ment must increase. Can it be supposed that if a 
reactivation of the economy and a rise in employ-
ment levels occurs, the labour force will meekly 
renounce its aspirations in favour of accumula-
tion and more lavish consumption on the part of 
the advantaged strata? Or will it be necessary to 
recognize that the system, in the present struc-
tural phase, is continually exposed to inflationa-
ry pressure, which weakens with unemployment 
and recrudesces with the reactivation of the 
economy? 
There is nothing surprising, then, in the 
peculiar thesis of those who maintain that the 
regular operation of the system entails a certain 
coefficient of unemployment in order to moder-
ate wage demands. 
I believe I have reached a clear and categor-
ical conclusion. It is not feasible to seek the social 
betterment of the less favoured groups through 
wage increases that raise the enterprises' produc-
tion costs. A historical phase in the evolution of 
capitalism is coming to an end without a solu-
tion's having been found for the fundamental 
problem of synchronizing distribution of the 
fruits of technical progress and accumulation of 
reproductive capital. 
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Moreover, to dream of resolving it by market 
laws would be a fatal illusion. The market, in so 
far as it operates correctly, is efficacious from the 
economic standpoint. But its social efficiency is 
partial and limited and so is its ecological effica-
cy. It is not the market in itself that should con-
cern us, but the underlying structure of society 
and the power relations inherent therein, as well 
as the ambivalence of technique. Nor must we 
labour under the delusion —much more danger-
ous still— that the abolition of the market will 
resolve these and other problems, since that 
would invest those who manage the system from 
the summit with a power which, besides jeopar-
dizing the system's efficiency, would prove in-
compatible with the progressive democratization 
of society. 
In face of the trend towards dynamic dise-
quilibrium which is so strikingly evidenced in the 
fiscal deficit, an attitude observable today, both 
in the United States and in the European coun-
tries that gave most impetus to the Welfare State, 
is concern for the containment of social services 
(besides what obviously relates to military ex-
penditure). Of course I do not believe that the 
considerable human welfare potential that tech-
nical progress has brought in its train is ex-
hausted. But a radical rectification of the trend 
towards dynamic disequilibrium is necessary, 
since if it were corrected it would be possible to 
realize the system's considerable potential for so-
cial betterment. 
To this propensity to dynamic disequilib-
rium are added the adverse consequences of 
irresponsible exploitation of non-renewable 
natural resources, and other serious ecological 
repercussions. To prevent or counteract these 
effects it is essential to increase the amount of 
capital per unit of output in order to reestablish 
the rate of increase of productivity. Accordingly, 
this rate is unfavourably affected not only by a 
falling-off in the intensity of accumulation, but 
also by the need to make technical progress eco-
logically sound. 
Perhaps it may seem strange to lay so much 
stress on the trend towards dynamic disequilib-
rium between expenditure and accumulation 
when it is recalled that half a century ago Keynes 
asserted that the operation of the system tended 
to engender over-saving. His vigorous imagina-
tion led him to suggest that the building of the 
pyramids of Egypt might have been, up to a 
point, a consequence of over-saving, which 
meant that the superfluity had to be invested in 
that way. Lively imagination and literacy polish 
too, such as used to be found in the great classics, 
in contrast with the heavy and muddled style that 
characterizes many of our economists. Keynes, 
then, largely attributed the depression of the 
1930s to this phenomenon of over-saving, which, 
in my opinion, was no such thing, but a cyclical 
maladjustment. Be that as it may, Keynes' con-
cept led many of his followers to ascribe unem-
ployment to a shortage of demand caused by 
over-saving. It was not granted to the eminent 
economist to foretell the trend towards 
structural disequilibrium between the rate of ex-
penditure and that of capital accumulation —a 
disequilibrium in which an insufficiency rather 
than a superabundance of saving has been appar-
ent. 
It is worth while to pause a moment here. 
When unemployment is cyclical the Keynesian 
expansion of demand is advisable, within certain 
limits; but when it derives from the aforesaid 
structural disequilibrium between the rates of 
expenditure and of accumulation such expan-
sion would help to intesify the inflation caused by 
the disequilibrium in question. And when it is 
sought to combat inflation with monetarism, the 
effects are counterproductive, as was pointed out 
above. In face of inflation and structural unem-
ployment, neither monetarism nor Keynesian-
ism will do. Other modes of regulation become 
essential. 
The explanatory accounts of the trend to-
wards dynamic disequilibrium and of its infla-
tionary effects that I am presenting in this first 
section originally related to peripheral capital-
ism. But, as I have already said, observation of 
facts has convinced me that these phenomena 
are also common to the centres, which should 
hardly be surprising, inasmuch as the periphery 
has copied from them the process of appropria-
tion of the fruits of technical progress. The only 
difference is that in the periphery the trend to-
wards dynamic disequilibrium is much more 
marked, owing to the specificity of its capitalism, 
which largely stems from the historical time-lag 
in its development. 
In any event, I felt it desirable to restate my 
interpretation of these phenomena as published 
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in various articles in this Review and in my book 
on peripheral capitalism.2 The criticisms I have 
received and the evolution of my own thinking 
have, I believe, enabled me to work out a clearer 
Let me dwell first on a few considerations rel-
evant to the international propagation of infla-
tion. I believe that to a large extent this phe-
nomenon is a general consequence of capitalist 
development, but I do not doubt that inflation in 
the United States —the system's main dynamic 
centre— has given great impetus to such prop-
agation, both because of its importance in the 
economy and because of the twofold role as 
national and as international currency which the 
dollar has acquired. 
This role as an international currency carries 
with it the great privilege of creating money and 
utilizing it free of cost, and, at the same time, the 
enormous responsibility of ensuring that its cre-
ation is consonant with the requirements of 
world development. 
The dominant factor in the creation of mon-
ey, however, has been, on the contrary, the 
United States' internal inflation. Inflation has 
spilled over on to the rest of the world. 
And just as it contributed to the great devel-
opment euphoria in days that are now receding 
farther and farther into the past, the United 
States' current policy of containing inflation by 
means of extremely high rates of interest has 
brought about a worldwide economic contrac-
tion, which in the periphery accentuates the grav-
ity of its own problems. The abundant creation 
of inflationary dollars at the international level is 
therefore being followed by a movement of de-
flationary return of those dollars to the United 
States, in response to the attraction of the rates of 
interest aforesaid. 
In its early days, up to the mid-1960s, infla-
tion was relatively moderate, but later the excep-
2Capitalismo periférico. Crisis y transformación, Mexico City, 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1981. 
and more accurate presentation, which I shall set 
forth below (section in), at the risk of inevitable 
redundancies. 
tional growth of both social and military expen-
diture, as from President Johnson's term in of-
fice, gave great impetus to the spiral, until the rise 
in petroleum prices {beginning in 1973) stepped 
it up to unusual proportions. It is often said that 
the upswing of oil prices was the determinant of 
inflation, with no memory of the fact that con-
vertibility had been abandoned years before in 
consequence of the inflation that was develop-
ing. 
The inflationary expansion of demand in the 
United States, as well as its investment abroad, 
could be partly met with the product of the rest 
of the world, especially in times of overvaluation 
of the currency. The said capital investments, 
particularly in Europe, helped to mitigate tech-
nological backwardness and to bring about an 
exceptional increase in productivity and rates of 
growth. 
The inflow of dollars would have caused a 
dangerous secondary accentuation of inflation if 
the countries concerned had not decided to de-
posit a large proportion of these resources in the 
Eurodollar market. This market was consider-
ably enlarged by substantial deposits of financial 
surpluses from oil. It was a favourable moment 
for tapping an appreciable share of these re-
sources by the sale of long-term securities and by 
issuing loans, above all to developing countries. 
This would have been an advantageous way of 
procuring a three-cornered reversion of these 
resources; originating in the major consumer 
centres, mainly in the United States, they would 
have returned there if long-term loans had been 
made to developing countries, which, in their 
turn, would have used them to purchase capital 
goods from the centres in question.3 
3This is not an a posteriori reflection. On the contrary, I 
had an opportunity to put this idea before the Secretary-
II 
International propagation of inflation 
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Events are showing, however, that private 
financial interests have outweighed sound long-
term considerations. The international banks in 
which the funds deriving from petroleum (as 
well as those originating elsewhere) were de-
posited gave great impetus to operations consist-
ing in short-term loans granted mainly to 
developing countries and to some of the socialist 
countries. It was not only such resources that 
were involved, but also the inflationary multipli-
cation of money which was added to the dollars 
flowing from inflation in the United States. For 
every dollar that reached the Eurocurrency mar-
ket, the international private banks created sever-
al additional dollars by expanding their credit, 
and thus aggravated inflationary pressures. 
These operations were subject to no regula-
tion whatever at the international level: a point 
worth recalling now that the entire world is suf-
fering their consequences. It was some time since 
long experience had led to the regulation of in-
ternal creation of money (although it gradually 
lost efficacy, as was remarked in the foregoing 
section). Yet the international operations of pri-
vate banks were conducted without regulation of 
any kind, under the sole guidance of the profit 
incentive, and brought in very substantial gains. 
The lust for profit took precedence over 
elementary considerations of foresight and re-
sponsibility. And the borrower countries ran into 
debt without much thought for the future. 
There was, in short, a convergence of irresponsi-
bilities. In some cases, short- and medium-term 
loans were spent on investments that ought 
rather to have been made on a long-term basis. 
And in others, they helped to pay the higher 
petroleum prices or to defray the cost of exces-
sive consumer imports encouraged by internal 
measures; or they were used to cover military 
expenditure. What is more, some Latin Amer-
ican countries that obtained plentiful resources 
from their petroleum sales also engaged in a 
drive to over-accelerate their investments and 
their rate of development by means of loans of 
this kind. 
General of the United Nations when he asked me to under-
take an emergency operation to combat critical situations in 
developing countries currently affected by the rise in pet-
roleum prices. The Secretary-General submitted my proposi-
tion to the General Assembly. 
As usually happens in the event of such 
abuses, theoretical justifications were by no 
means lacking: international market forces had 
to be left to operate without restriction. The free 
play of market forces would entail the most 
advantageous allocation of resources. The pri-
vate banks would be more efficient in this respect 
than the official international credit institutions; 
and thus they came to acquire the lion's share of 
world financing. 
I spoke earlier of the deflationary return to 
the United States of some of the dollars previous-
ly poured out on the world by the spill-over of 
inflation. This return, as is common knowledge, 
is due to the exceptional upswing in rates of 
interest. It is worth while to dwell for a moment 
on this singularly important phenomenon. 
Inflation deriving from the fiscal deficit, as 
well as from the distribution struggle, is yet an-
other manifestation of the trend towards disequilib-
rium between expenditure and reproductive 
capital accumulation. The two processes feed 
each other. As regards inflation of fiscal origin, 
rather than introducing appropriate adjust-
ments in expenditure and taxation, preference 
was given to attracting saving to the State in or-
der to cover the deficit. 
It is true that because of the nature of the 
system increased taxation would also have had an 
inflationary impact, for the reasons set forth in 
section i. And an appropriate income policy 
would have been required to moderate its 
effects. In any event, allocating a considerable 
proportion of saving to covering the deficit had 
much the same sort of adverse influence on 
capital accumulation and productivity as taxes 
would have exerted on the surplus. Moreover, 
the rise in rates of interest on saving was accom-
panied by a restriction of credit and an increase 
in bank interest rates so as to prevent an infla-
tionary transfer of resources to the financial 
market. The adverse effects of credit restriction 
are common knowledge. They were not con-
fined to the United States, inasmuch as the high 
interest rates —as has already been pointed 
out— caused a return of dollars, raising the cost 
of money and resulting in world deflation. Thus 
the return of dollars to their original source 
brought very serious problems to the countries 
concerned, compelling them to carry their own 
restrictive measures to extremes. 
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A distinction should be drawn between the 
international propagation first of inflation and 
then of deflation, and the internal inflationary 
phenomena explained in section i. International 
inflation has helped to aggravate these. The 
same thing is true of the periphery, whose own 
problems have been seriously complicated as a 
result of the international monetary vicissitudes. 
All this involves a high level of unemploy-
ment everywhere wit d a colossal waste of devel-
opment potential. If these adverse conse-
quences and their social incidence are compared 
with the euphoria of the years of prosperity, it 
may well be asked whether, in the long run, slow-
er and steadier growth would not have been 
preferable to exceptional rates of development 
followed by a slump in the tempo. 
This question strikes, of course, right to the 
heart of the matter, i.e., to the very process of 
appropriation and distribution of the fruits of 
technical progress, as well as the accumulation of 
reproductive capital. This is the fundamental 
problem that must be resolved in face of the 
irremediable dissolution of a historical category 
of capitalist development, whose positive results 
cannot be denied, notwithstanding the serious 
disturbances that were being hatched in the 
evolution of the structure of society. 
Lastly, international monetary reform is 
being discussed, and the periphery has not been 
indifferent to the proposition. Bretton Woods 
has been left behind by events. But it is also 
advisable to query whether an international re-
form could be efficacious and lasting if the large 
countries did not undertake a process of internal 
change of their own in order to correct their 
tendency towards dynamic disequilibrium be-
tween expenditure and reproductive capital 
accumulation. If this tendency is not rectified in 
time and continues to be a source of inflation, 
phenomena may occur that are incompatible 
with the disciplined creation of money to meet 
the real needs of the international economy. 
Ill 
The appropriation and retention of the fruits of technical 
progress and the distribution struggle 
Since in section I we attached so much impor-
tance to the structural phenomenon of the sur-
plus, the time has now come to explain, firstly 
how it comes about, next how it is retained, and 
lastly how the social struggle to share in the fruits 
of thechnical progress triggers the trend towards 
dynamic disequilibrium between the rate of ex-
penditure and that of reproductive capital accu-
mulation. This trend inevitably leads to inflation 
and cannot be contained by means of the mone-
tary instrument without that huge economic and 
social cost on which at the due moment we laid 
stress. 
Let us begin, then, with a simple schematic 
explanation of the economic surplus. The sur-
plus is closely linked to technical progress, which 
finds expression, thanks to capital accumulation, 
in a continuous superimposition of new technical 
layers of increasing productivity on technical 
layers in which productivity is less. This is a pro-
cess which is incessantly renewed. 
It happens that when a technical layer is 
added in which productivity is higher than in 
those preceding it, the wages and salaries of the 
labour force thus employed do not improve cor-
relatively with the increment in productivity. 
Within the play of market laws, an improvement 
will be obtained only by that part of the labour 
force which, at all levels, possesses the increasing 
skills that technical progress demands. The pro-
ductivity increment is the result of these skills 
plus capital accumulation in which technological 
innovations take shape. The wages of the rest of 
the labour force employed in new technical 
layers do not increase correlatively with produc-
tivity for a very simple reason: competition on 
the part of the manpower which is left behind in 
lower-productivity layers where income is less, 
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and of the labour force entering the market in 
consequence of population growth. This com-
petition prevents wages from rising in keeping 
with the increased productivity of the new tech-
nical layer. 
I have applied the term surplus to the pro-
ductivity increment which, not being transferred 
to the labour force, remains in enterprises and 
corresponds to the means of production. A clear 
distinction must be drawn between the surplus 
and the remuneration of those who organize and 
direct productive activity, whether they are the 
owners of the means of production or not. 
The surplus has its origin, then, in structural 
heterogeneity, that is, in the diversity of technical 
layers, productivity and payment of the labour 
force. It is conceivable that capital accumulation 
and the skills needed to meet its requirements 
may tend to lead progressively to homogeneity, 
with similar levels of productivity, and equal pay 
for equal skills. In that case the surplus would 
peter out, as would likewise its dynamic role in 
accumulation, and other forms of capital accu-
mulation would have to be put in its place. In any 
event, the process would be a relatively slow one, 
to which a threat would be constituted by the 
incessant diversification of goods and services 
which militates against reproductive capital accu-
mulation, as well as by population growth, espe-
cially in the periphery. 
Meanwhile, the redistributive power of the 
labour force and of the State gradually achieves 
what market laws are slow to accomplish. And as 
redistribution takes place, the expansion of ex-
penditure which it involves is added to the ever-
increasing expenditure of the social groups be-
nefiting by the surplus. Thus the system tends 
towards that dynamic disequilibrium between 
the rate of expenditure and that of reproductive 
capital accumulation which was mentioned in 
section I. 
This tendency towards disequilibrium can-
not be explained, however, without showing 
—likewise briefly— how the surplus is retained 
in enterprises, instead of being socially dissemi-
nated as the neoclassical theories assume; and 
how in the course of the structural changes in 
society the redistributive power of the labour 
force and of the State weakens the growth rate of 
the surplus, to the detriment of the rate of repro-
ductive capital accumulation. 
My interpretation is based on study of the 
dynamics of the production process and the var-
ious phases that occur during the time it takes, 
from the primary phase to the stage when the 
final goods (both consumer and capital goods, 
between which there is no difference where the 
production process as such is concerned) are 
launched on the market. 
This introduction of the time factor is essen-
tial, as is likewise the growth of production. 
Otherwise ¡t would be impossible to explain how 
the increment in productivity which has been 
achieved in the various phases can be absorbed 
without a fall in prices. For if enterprises do not 
transfer the whole of the productivity increment 
to wages, the demand stemming from what they 
pay out will be insufficient in relation to the in-
crease in productivity. 
Herein lies the significance of the time factor 
in the dynamics of the production process. In 
order to understand it, the various phases of 
production under way must be clearly dis-
tinguished from the final stage of output of end 
goods. Demand for the latter does not derive 
from the income that the enterprises have paid 
out formerly in the course of their production 
but from the income they are paying out during 
the process of producing new final goods which 
will be put on the market later on. 
Such, in the dynamics of production, is the 
effect of the time factor. Because of it, the 
amount of goods in process of production, dur-
ing a given period of time, is larger than the 
quantity of final goods in the same period. In 
other words, final goods lag behind current pro-
duction. Thus, the increase in final goods in any 
period in relation to the one before it could not 
be absorbed without the expansion of demand 
deriving from the income paid out by enterprises 
in the course of the production under way be-
tween those same periods. 
The aditional amount of final goods results 
both from the increase in employment and the 
rise in productivity. And if demand expands 
enough, the productivity increment stays in the 
enterprises in the form of a larger surplus (or an 
increase in profits, in a first approximation). 
It should be explained that this larger sur-
plus is not all obtained when the final goods are 
sold on the market, but step by step appears in 
advance in each phase of the production process, 
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in accordance with the demand expected by the 
enterprises concerned. Thus partial surpluses 
emerge. If demand for final goods is sufficient 
and confirms the expectations entertained, the 
same rate of demand can continue for the whole 
of the production underway. Otherwise, adjust-
ments in one or other direction will supervene, 
according to whether demand for final goods 
does or does not expand sufficiently to absorb 
the increase in these. 
We are now in a position to introduce the 
creation of money into our argument. We were 
saying that the income paid out in the course of 
production generated the demand for final 
goods. If this demand is sufficient enterprises in 
the final phase recover the income they paid out 
in due course and obtain their partial surplus. If 
production were static, the money thus obtained 
by the said enterprises would suffice for the 
purchase of goods in process in the preceding 
phase and payment of their own labour force. 
And the same thing would happen in every 
phase. On the contrary, in the course of increas-
ing production the money obtained by enter-
prises in the various phases would not be enough 
to step up their own employment and the purch-
ase of goods in process of production in the pre-
ceding phase, the corresponding partial surplus 
included. 
Thus, as production under way increases, 
enterprises have to resort to the creation of 
money by the bank system, save to the limited 
extent that they may have available stocks of 
money (for simplicity's sake, we shall eliminate 
this possible increase in the circulation of money 
relation, which makes no difference to our argu-
ment). 
The role of the monetary authority is to per-
mit the creation of the money required for the 
growth of income in production under way so 
that the increment in demand thus generated 
may be equivalent to the increase in output of 
final goods. In this way monetary stability can be 
maintained. 
There are two principal sources of an in-
crease in demand, namely, the growth of 
ongoing production, as has been explained, or 
the expenditure of the State, when its income 
does not suffice to cover its disbursements and 
recourse is had to the creaction of money. Infla-
tion likewise has its origin in these two main 
sources. 
We will now consider first the inflation stem-
ming from ongoing production, and then that of 
fiscal origin. The two are closely interrelated, as 
will be seen in due course. 
The additional income paid out by enter-
prises in the course of production under way 
corresponds to the increase in employment and 
in salaries and wages. In the play of market laws 
wage increases are related to the rise in produc-
tivity that enterprises expect to achieve. In other 
words, the rate of increase of wages corresponds 
to the rate of growth of productivity (it should be 
recalled that another part of productivity, that 
which is not transferred to the labour force, goes 
to swell the surplus). 
What happens when the labour force is no 
longer passive, and acquires the necessary power 
to increase its wages at a rate higher than the 
growth rate of productivity, whether in quest of a 
genuine improvement or in order to recoup it-
self for taxation? 
Obviously, in such a case the expansion of 
demand originating in production under way 
outstrips the increase in productivity in respect 
of final goods. An inflationary movement thus 
begins whose persistence will depend, firstly, 
upon whether the monetary authority raises the 
rate of creation of money in order to cope with 
higher wages; and, secondly, upon the con-
tinuance of the struggle for better pay. If both 
conditions are fulfilled, spiralling inflation will 
inevitably ensue. 
It may usefully be asked, before proceeding 
farther, whether the monetary authority, in the 
fulfilment of its responsibilities for preserving 
price stability, could not refuse to grant such an 
increase in the creation of money. If this were to 
happen, enterprises would be unable to raise 
prices and would find themselves compelled to 
defray their heavier costs out of the increment in 
productivity, to the detriment of the growth rate 
of the surplus, or of the surplus itself, according 
to the strength of the pressure for redistribution. 
Clearly, besides reducing the profitability of 
enterprises, this would adversely affect the rate 
of capital accumulation and consequently of em-
ployment. The opposition put up by enterprises 
to this restrictive policy, as well as its social con-
sequences, would preclude its pursuit for any 
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great length of time. Enterprises will spare no 
effort to defend the surplus and its growth. 
In this case, an increase in remunerations 
outstripping the growth rate of productivity will 
involve an expansion of demand accompanied 
by additional creation of money in order to raise 
prices. 
But this is not all. The price rise will entail an 
upswing in rates of interest. Otherwise, a flight of 
money abroad will take place. And thus the 
financial costs of enterprises will rise, pushing up 
prices first and then wages. And the spiral will 
attain greater proportions. 
We were saying a moment ago that enter-
prises try to defend themselves against the 
onslaught of wage increases by putting up prices. 
They succeed in doing so, but the effects 
obtained are momentary, for if rates of pay are 
raised it has to be at the expense of the growth of 
the surplus. The defence in question is therefore 
relative, since in this way the growth rate of the 
surplus rises and falls. Moreover, the rise in in-
terest rates operates to the partial detriment of 
the surplus and of wages. Thus it happens that 
the holders of liquid resources are able to defend 
the real value of their money more efficaciously 
than those who are defending the surplus. 
This first phase of the inflationary spiral may 
be accompanied by some increase in production. 
But it is also marked by steadily worsening distor-
tions, both internal and external, which it is 
needless to consider here because they are well-
known and because they make no difference to 
our basic argument. Sooner or later, however, 
the monetary authority will attempt to contain 
the inflationary process, to which end it will ulti-
mately resort to the only instrument at its dispos-
al, i.e., the restriction of credit accompanied by 
increases in interest rates which exceed the rise in 
prices, in consonance with the degree of severity 
of the restrictive policy. 
T h e close of the first inflationary phase 
ushers in the second, that of the intention to 
contain inflation. To meet the requirements of 
enterprises and the pressure of labour itself, the 
monetary authority had been compelled to facili-
tate the creation of money and thus unleash in-
flation. Now it has to backtrack. T o do so by 
means of the monetary instrument is an ex-
ceedingly difficult task, but if it is tenaciously 
carried out inflation can be curbed. The time has 
come to explain the different manifestations of 
this anti-inflationary policy, making use of the 
production under way-finished goods scheme 
set forth above. 
The case we are about to consider is char-
s acterized by the firm determination of the labour 
force to preserve, if not to improve, its real in-
come, by outstripping price rises in the course of 
the spiral. We already know, however, that soon-
er or later the unemployment caused by restric-
tive policy calls a halt to wage adjustments. 
Unemployment is an immediate conse-
quence of this policy and is subsequently accen-
tuated by successive decreases in the growth rate 
of production under way or even by negative 
rates. 
When the monetary authority first refuses to 
allow the rate of creation of money to keep pace 
with the rise in the income paid out by enter-
prises, the latter will tend to raise wages at the 
expense of employment. Production under way, 
like employment, will be unable to increase as 
much as the income aforesaid or will have to be 
reduced, according to the strength of the up-
ward pressure of salaries and wages. 
While this is happening in the case of pro-
duction under way, final goods continue to in-
crease by virtue of the lag deriving from the time 
taken by the production process. The time factor 
must always be borne in mind in order to under-
stand this line ofreasoning. Some time will elapse 
before the slackening of production under way 
makes itself felt in the supply of final goods. 
Meanwhile, production in process continues to 
decline until wages cease to rise, as will be seen 
later. Thus there is a disparity between supply 
and demand with respect to final goods. The 
increase in demand deriving from the produc-
tion of future goods under way is insufficient to 
absorb the increment in current goods, and the 
result is an unsalable glut of them on the market. 
This left-over supply slows down the rate of 
demand for goods in process in all their phases. 
Thus, demand also proves insufficient to absorb 
productivity increments in these phases and the 
growth rate of the partial surpluses and there-
fore of the global surplus is correspondingly re-
duced, as the rates of production and employ-
ment slacken. Thus the initial reduction accom-
panying credit restrictions is supplemented by 
the consequences of insufficient demand. 
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This further decline in the rate of produc-
tion under way takes place while wages are con-
tinuing to rise. Accordingly, the production in 
question is subject to a twofold pressure: exerted 
firstly, at the beginning, by credit restriction, and 
secondly, at the end, by the insufficiency of de-
mand for final goods. The continued increase in 
remunerations and in rates of interest goes on 
pushing up prices, while the rate of production 
under way diminishes or becomes negative. Here-
in lies the explanation (in this case) of the former-
ly unknown phenomenon of an upward trend in 
prices and a contraction of production and em-
ployment (stagflation); it is basically due to the 
fact that wages continue to be adjusted to the rate 
of inflation. 
To revert to the foregoing question: the 
shortfall in demand is continuous, because, ow-
ing to credit restriction, the income and demand 
generated in the production under way are not 
sufficient to absorb the supply of final goods. 
And supply surpluses are constantly making an 
appearance, with the consequences described 
above. 
But this succession of movements towards 
contraction cannot be indefinitely prolonged. 
Increasing unemployment ultimately quells the 
labour force's endeavours to recoup itself for the 
upward trend of prices in the course of the spiral. 
Wage increases dwindle until at last they peter 
out altogether. And as this happens the rate of 
decrease of the income and demand generated 
by production under way begins to weaken. But 
owing to the time factor, it is some while before 
this weakening comes to affect the supply of final 
goods. The disparity between supply and de-
mand, then, continues, although becoming less 
marked. Thus the supplies left over gradually 
diminish and consequently production under 
way declines less steeply. 
We now enter upon the third phase, with a 
highly significant phenomenon. The slackening 
of the downward trend in production under way 
and employment means that the decline of the 
corresponding income slackens correlatively, 
without this being offset by ever-smaller wage 
increases. And as this process of weakening takes 
time to spread to final goods, the disparity be-
tween the decrease in demand and the decrease 
in supply continues to grow progressively less. 
Both diminish, but in the case of demand for 
final goods the process is slower than in that of 
supply. In this way the inadequacy of demand 
and the impulse towards contraction of produc-
tion are also reduced. 
To all this must be added the fall in financial 
costs. For as wage increases diminish, interest 
rates are brought down, and, consequently, the 
decline of income and demand deriving from 
production under way is still further lessened. 
Thus, in the third phase while the demand 
originating in the production under way de-
clines, it does so at a rate lower than the rate of 
decrease of the supply of finished goods. So that 
the demand shrinks faster than the supply of 
final goods —still lagging behind— until the two 
break even when wages have ceased to rise. At 
this point the surplus supply of final goods will 
have been exhausted and so will the movement 
towards contraction of the economy. 
Equivalence between demand and supply 
does not necessarily mean that the next stage will 
be that reactivation of the economy without 
which it will be impossible to reinstate the surplus 
and its dynamic role. In default of an expansion-
ist policy, it may well be asked whether a spon-
taneous movement of recovery does not take 
place. My answer to this is in the affirmative, 
although such a movement has to be supported 
by credit expansion. I will go on to explain. 
When mentioning the increase of income in 
the course of the production under way and the 
corresponding expansion of demand, I omitted 
—in order to avoid premature complications— 
to point out that a part of demand is deflected 
towards services, when it gradually returns to 
final goods. In this way some of the money cre-
ated by the bank system remains in the services 
sector and continues to circulate there in the 
increasing course of production under way. 
In turn, when an expansion of demand is 
followed by its decline, the part that is deflected 
into services becomes less than the part that re-
turns in the form of demand for goods. 
In my opinion, this return is a spontaneous 
element of reactivation, both in the case we are 
considering and in that of cyclical depression. 
The same might be said with respect to foreign 
trade. When production expands, demand tends 
to switch towards imports and to increase inter-
nally in respect of exportable goods. And when a 
contraction occurs the opposite happens, to the 
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benefit of demand for final goods or those in 
process of production. All of which means that it 
is indispensable to introduce the notion of time 
and space into analysis of the dynamics of 
growth. 
Let us now revert to the implacable logic of 
monetarism. Following on the preceding argu-
ment, the conclusion is reached that it is possible 
to do away with the inflation caused when the 
rate of increase of wages is higher than that of 
productivity. The increase in question is not only 
that whereby the labour force proposes to im-
prove its real income, but also that with which it 
claims to recoup itself for the increase in State 
expenditure, deriving either from the social 
advantages which the labour force itself obtains, 
or from other outlays, of which the cost ultimate-
ly falls, in one way or another, on its shoulders. 
The worst of all this is that, given the system 
of appropriation of the surplus and of redis-
tribution, no means other than monetarism are 
available for correcting the type of inflation with 
which we are concerned. 
This is unquestionably an aberration, im-
posed by a system which is incompatible with the 
structural changes of society and the consequent 
changes in power relations. The aberration has 
its roots in the system itself. The upholders of 
neoclassical theory fail to recognize it, as has been 
remarked elsewhere. For in their view monetar-
ism is the way to reestablish the correct function-
ing of the system. 
In reality, this attitude on the part of neo-
classicism is comprehensible, since according to 
its arguments the fruits of technical progress are 
socially disseminated by competition; we have 
tried to show, however, that even under a régime 
of absolute economic freedom this does not hap-
pen, but instead a large proportion of the pro-
ductivity increment is retained and increased 
mainly in the hands of the upper strata. Conse-
quently, the strivings of the labour force to im-
prove its real income in excess of the rate of 
productivity and at the expense of the surplus 
are fully justified from the standpoint of redistri-
butive ethics. But the system allows neither this 
nor State participation at the expense of the sur-
plus, and reacts in the way we have explained. 
Furthermore, the economic and social (and 
possibly political) cost of credit restriction is 
enormous. It means reducing economic activity 
with the consequent unemployment and cutting 
down the surplus until it disappears altogether 
—depending upon the degree of severity of the 
restrictive policy—, to the detriment of capital 
accumulation. A considerable amount of real in-
come, moreover, is transferred from productive 
activity {enterprises and labour force) to finan-
cial activity. 
This last point is deserving of special men-
tion. The raising of interest rates in accordance 
with the rate at which prices rise implies defend-
ing not only small and medium-scale savers, but, 
above all, groups with large liquid financial re-
sources. What is more, when the inflationary 
spiral has attained disquieting proportions, posi-
tive interest rates are apt to soar, while unem-
ployment increases and productive activity suf-
fers. In other words, while real income contracts, 
an increasing proportion is appropriated by the 
social groups in question. 
We said that the surplus is adversely affected 
in the course of anti-inflationary policy and 
might be converted from positive to negative. It 
is true that the surplus is not always used in full, 
especially in peripheral capitalism, for the pur-
pose of increasing reproductive capital. Imita-
tion of the consumption patterns of the centres 
represents a very powerful brake on accumula-
tion, not only in the upper strata but also, 
although much less intensively, at lower levels of 
the social structure. 
This unsatisfactory utilization of reproduc-
tive capital accumulation potential, combined 
with the rapid rate of population growth in the 
periphery, makes a notable contribution to social 
marginalization, whether in rural areas or in the 
towns, or rather, to the shift of marginalization 
from the countryside to the city. This shift is of 
great socio-political importance, since the disper-
sion of the socially backward strata over vast ru-
ral areas is one thing, and quite another is margi-
nalization in huge urban conglomerates where 
these strata awaken to awareness of their social 
situation and of their political power to partici-
pate in the struggle for redistribution. 
To close this section, mention should be 
made of what was said in the appropriate context 
to the effect that negative interest rates, which 
would undoubtedly prove favourable to produc-
tive activity, tend to cause a flight of money 
abroad, as has happened in Latin America in 
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recent years, sometimes on a very large scale. 
Exchange controls may prove efficacious in stop-
ping the flight of foreign exchange, but not for 
long, since they give rise to manipulations, on the 
part of both exporters and importers, aimed at 
diverting foreign exchange from the official 
market and negotiating it on the free market 
—especially when there is a big difference be-
tween the respective quotations. 
A clear distinction must be drawn between 
inflation deriving from the fiscal deficit and in-
flation stemming from the labour force's efforts 
to improve its well-being by recourse to wage 
increases outrunning the rate of productivity or 
to social advantages or employment under the 
State, the cost of which, in the last analysis, has to 
be borne largely, if not entirely, by the labour 
force itself, and sooner or later leads to a mone-
tarist reaction. 
It should be stated from the outset that the 
two forms of inflation are closely interlinked and 
react upon each other. Inflation caused by the 
fiscal deficit pushes up prices and pulls down the 
real wages of the labour force. This implies a 
substantial transfer of real income from the 
labour force to the enterprises; but it is very 
short-lived, since because of price increases in-
terest rates also rise, so that part of the income 
increments (or generation of inflation) of enter-
prises is transferred to financial activity. 
It should not be supposed, however, that the 
case in hand is similar to the one we described 
earlier. The proposal to correct the inflationary 
effects of the fiscal deficit by means of a policy of 
monetary restriction leads to results which are 
far from efficacious even though so heavy a so-
cial and political cost has to be paid. The slacken-
ing of the rate of productive activity and of em-
ployment attributable to this policy ultimately 
helps to increase the fiscal deficit. 
The fiscal deficit can be combated only by 
increasing taxation and reducing expenditure. 
But as was remarked in section i, if the tax bur-
den has to be borne by the labour force and this 
latter has the power to recoup itself, the taxes in 
question become inflationary. And if the burden 
falls on the surplus and weakens the rate of accu-
mulation, the rate of productivity also declines. 
For the deficit is a manifestation of the tendency 
towards dynamic disequilibrium, and conse-
quently eludes the conventional methods of at-
tack. 
Albeit the two forms of inflation are of 
different origin, they influence each other, 
giving impetus to the spiral. The inflation that 
derives from the spiral leads to pay increases on 
the part not only of the State but also of enterpri-
ses, and causes or intensifies cost and price infla-
tion. This, in turn, causes or aggravates the fiscal 
deficit. And if it is attacked with the monetary 
instrument, bringing about a contraction, as was 
explained a moment ago, this has an adverse 
incidence on the State, generating or increasing 
the deficit. 
The problem has become unmanageable, 
both in the centres and in the periphery, failing 
an endeavour to strike at the roots of the tenden-
cy towards dynamic disequilibrium. 
After these brief remarks on inflation caused 
by a fiscal deficit, it is time to revert to the infla-
tion that stems from wage increases outstripping 
the rate of productivity. We have explained be-
fore how the policy of monetary restriction 
works. In the end, the insufficiency of demand 
produces contraction and unemployment; and 
that finally puts a stop to wage increases. 
If a fiscal deficit occurs at the same time, 
however, monetary policy cannot achieve these 
effects, since, as rates of pay are reduced and the 
disparity between supply and demand dwindles, 
the fiscal deficit brings in its train an increase in 
inflationary demand which wholly or partly 
offsets, or altogether overrides, the tendency to-
wards equivalence between the two. If this is so, 
monetary policy cannot contrive to curb infla-
tion. 
We have said nothing of inflation of external 
origin, whether it increases costs directly or in-
directly through rising prices. If the labour force 
has power to recoup itself it will react by insisting 
on higher pay, thus triggering or accentuating 
the spiral. Monetarism will have to impose a 
further wage squeeze so that the surplus can be 
re-established. In the end the burden of the cost 
will fall on the labour force. 
In this case, as in connection with the role of 
monetary policy, if rates of payment have been 
contained by the severity of unemployment, it 
may be asked what will happen if a reactivation 
policy, which is inevitable, increases employment 
once again. Is it conceivable that the labour force 
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will renounce its claims as it had to in an un-
favourable situation of large-scale unemploy-
ment? I do not think so. Sooner or later it will try 
to recover the real income that it has lost, making 
room for inflation to escalate afresh. Herein lies 
the basic problem not only of peripheral capital-
ism but also of capitalism in the centres, given the 
nature of the process of appropriation of the 
surplus, income distribution and reproductive 
capital accumulation. 
IV 
The crisis in the periphery and the incidence of the 
crisis in the centres 
The notorious consequences of the crisis in the 
centres foster a certain proclivity in the 
periphery to blame them for the serious ills and 
vicissitudes of our development process. It is 
often forgotten how deep-seated is the tendency 
towards internal disequilibrium in our develop-
ment which joins forces with these external fac-
tors. 
The trend towards internal disequilibrium 
has been accentuated by the crisis in the centres, 
but it dates from far back, and in the days of the 
boom in the centres was already harshly appar-
ent in the shape of stubborn forms of social infla-
tion. As it evolved, significant marks of specificity 
were to emerge, of which the explanation lay 
mainly in the time-lag in the history of our devel-
opment. 
In what did this specificity consist? There are 
three features of signal importance. The first 
relates to the great structural heterogeneity, the 
wide diversity of technical layers and the distance 
between them. On this account, it would seem 
that the proportion of the surplus appropriated 
chiefly by the upper strata is larger than in the 
centres. The second emanates from imitation of 
the conspicuous consumption patterns of the 
centres, especially those of their upper strata. In 
this way a substantial proportion of the repro-
ductive capital accumulation potential which the 
surplus represents is squandered. And lastly, 
there is the negative effect on the surplus itself 
produced by the trend towards dynamic dise-
quilibrium which has so greatly influenced infla-
tion, as well as by the measures adopted to con-
tain it. These effects have intensified the structur-
al tendencies towards an imbalance in relations 
with the centres which are characteristic of 
peripheral development, again to the detriment 
of the periphery's surplus and its dynamic role. 
To put it briefly: productivity is lower in the 
periphery because of its historical time-lag. But 
there is no such time-lag in the imitation of con-
sumption which tends to spill from the upper 
strata downward, but with enormous disparities. 
All this is damaging to reproductive accu-
mulation, a point that needs emphasizing, be-
cause of its adverse social implications. There is 
not enough capital to remedy social marginality 
by increasing employment, either among the ru-
ral population or among the population that has 
moved from the countryside to the towns. Thus 
absorption of manpower falls short of what is 
needed, detrimentally to the rate of productivity 
and, therefore, to the rate of growth and to capi-
tal accumulation potential. This state of affairs is 
aggravated by the exceptionally rapid rate of 
population growth. 
The vicious circle that cramps development 
possibilities is plain to be seen: accumulation is 
less than it could be because conspicuous con-
sumption, mainly on the part of the upper strata, 
and insufficient productive employment in the 
lower strata, preclude the socially efficacious de-
velopment of reproductive capital accumulation 
potential. 
Of course there are other factors that oper-
ate in the same direction, including the hypertro-
phy of the State, in which another manifestation 
of the vicious circle is apparent. Inadequate accu-
mulation, not only as regards the lower strata but 
throughout the system, generates a relatively re-
dundant labour force which in the end is em-
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ployed mainly by the State, a circumstance that 
ultimately militates against reproductive accu-
mulation. 
For all these reasons the productivity of the 
system is less than it might be, both in absolute 
terms and in respect of its growth, in contrast 
with the tendency shown by private and social 
spending and by State expenditure to increase at 
high speed, as revealed by our theoretical expla-
nations. Understandable, then, is the nature of 
the dynamic disequilibrium which generally 
finds expression in very high and mounting rates 
of inflation. 
This is the specificity of peripheral develop-
ment as regards the appropriation of the sur-
plus, accumulation, productivity and the strug-
gle for redistribution. 
In our countries the inflationary spiral usual-
ly brings highly significant political consequen-
ces in its train. It is true that the democratization 
process is difficult and immature, and when in-
flationary distortions contribute to its interrup-
tion, authoritarian governments, urged on by 
dominant groups, stop or regulate wage increas-
es in order to contain inflation. The facts show 
that this has done more to re-establish the sur-
plus and enhance the splendour of the privileged 
consumer society than to increase reproductive 
capital. And inflation has continued on account 
of other factors, mainly the fiscal deficit or the 
deterioration of the terms of trade. 
Accordingly, regulation of wages having 
failed, all that is left is monetarism, which enjoys 
such prestige in some centres. All too well do we 
know the serious economic and social conse-
quences which have followed in its wake. There is 
no point in listing them again. 
It is small comfort to the periphery to say 
that the centres have fallen into similar aberra-
tions. Or to observe that the effects of their crisis 
have done a very great deal to aggravate the 
tendency towards an imbalance in our relations 
with the centres, a matter that we shall go on to 
discuss. 
This is a longstanding phenomenon that 
ECLA has tried to elucidate since its earliest days, 
when it analysed the calamitous impact of the 
great world depression on our development. 
That crisis of capitalism in the centres, many 
as were the evils by which it was accompanied, 
nevertheless had the virtue of triggering a 
reaction against passiveness on the part of the 
periphery. Until then a mere looker-on at the 
sweeping current of industrialization in the 
centres, the periphery, under the temporary 
constraints of the depression, took its first deci-
sive step towards mingling in that current and 
thus embarking upon its industrialization effort 
and combating the external disequilibrium 
which for the first time was making itself felt with 
disquieting intensity. 
It necessarily had to do this through import 
substitution. As years went by, it started upon the 
venture of exporting manufactures, benefiting 
by the boom period in the centres. This was a 
very positive event, which, however, helped to 
weaken import substitution policy. Not without a 
certain amount of anathematizing in some cases. 
The pendulum, which had swung too far in the 
' direction of import substitution policy, thus went 
to the other extreme. It was thought that on the 
basis of exports of manufactures our countries 
could attain high rates of development; and not 
only was import substitution policy neglected, 
but also, as a corollary, no further serious 
thought was given to the regional market and 
reciprocal trade. 
The present grave crisis of capitalism has 
dispelled great illusions. The perceptible decline 
in the rates of development of the centres is very 
unfavourably affecting exports of manufactures 
and their prices, while the cost of imports is ris-
ing. In the centres, again, there has been a recru-
descence of protectionism, which, of course, had 
not been done away with during the years of 
prosperity. The liberalization of trade had relat-
ed mainly to the goods resulting from technolog-
ical innovations which were exceptionally nutri-
tious to the trade of the centres. The periphery 
was once again left on the sidelines, without 
active participation. 
The outlook is not promising; on the con-
trary, development projections for the centres 
are really discouraging, at least as far as this 
decade is concerned. Unemployment is very se-
rious there and constitutes a formidable barrier 
to imports from the periphery which compete 
with the centres' own production. 
But the obstacle is not set up by unemploy-
ment alone. In the boom years, when immigra-
tion of foreign workers was allowed, nothing of 
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importance was done to overcome the reluctance 
to import goods from the periphery. 
I am inclined to think that there is something 
more in this than a circumstancial fact. It is in my 
view a new structural phenomenon to which no 
response has as yet been made in the shape of 
new trade formulas. 
A moment's reflection is justifiable to 
promote discussion of this question. First and 
foremost, let us not forget comparative advan-
tages. Undoubtedly, exporting from the periphery 
manufactures with a relatively low technological 
content would make it possible to purchase 
manufactures with a high technological content 
from the centres. Centres and periphery alike 
would benefit from their comparative advan-
tages. Obviously, while the industrial development 
of our countries was still in embryo, comparative 
advantages in trade in manufactures could not 
possibly exist. Now they can. 
What is it that leads the centres to forego 
these advantages, prejudicially to themselves as 
well as to the development of the periphery? 
To understand this, the changes that take 
place in the structure of production of the cen-
tres should be borne in mind. The rise in produc-
tivity has enabled them to increase the surplus 
and capital accumulation, with the consequent 
expansion of employment, income and global 
demand. And although this process has weak-
ened, the composition of demand has gone on 
continually changing. As the result of technolog-
ical innovations, productivity is stepped up, and 
in addition the goods and services offered to 
meet demand are increasingly diversified. This 
process is accompanied by constant occupational 
shifts, occasioned not only by the labour force 
increment which makes for activities where the 
growth of demand is most thriving, but also by 
the displacement of workers who were already 
employed in activities less favoured by demand. 
Similarly, the capital investment deriving from 
the surplus undergoes corresponding shifts. 
In consequence of the dynamic disequilib-
rium in the centres the growth rate of accumula-
tion and employment has slackened, with the 
consequent decline in the rate of absorption of 
manpower. 
The periphery has managed to assimilate the 
patterns of production of the centres in respect 
of manufactures with a relatively low technologi-
cal content and can compete with the centres' 
own output of this type at lower prices, causing 
unemployment and reducing the surplus and, 
therefore, accumulation, to the detriment of 
manpower shifts. That the dimensions of this 
phenomenon have often been exaggerated does 
not mean that it does not exist. True, it has 
barely begun and the centres are reacting with 
various restrictive measures. Viewed in the light 
of future prospects, this fact represents a major 
obstacle to the increasingly dynamic role that the 
periphery could play, for the first time, in the 
development of the centres. 
This incipient external vulnerability of" the 
surplus in the centres explains why even in boom 
years they did not liberalize imports of peripher-
al manufactures. 
It should be taken into account that the in-
strument of international competition is not so 
much reduction of prices as diversification of 
goods. Prices generally fall when innovations re-
sult in the appearance of other and superior 
goods which attract demand. 
This type of competition from the periphery 
touches the centres on the quick in these times of 
dynamic disequilibrium which have brought 
with them large-scale unemployment. And if this 
happens in the case of goods stemming from 
technological innovations, demand for which is 
usually brisk, matters are much worse when com-
petition from the periphery affects goods for 
which demand in the centres grows slowly in 
comparison with demand for other goods. In 
addition to the effects of the sluggish rate of 
development of the centres, imports from the 
periphery are subject to unilateral restrictions 
which prevent them from enjoying the compara-
tive advantages that the centres are still blazon-
ing vis-à-vis the industrialization of the periph-
ery. 
It is no use expecting that the centres will 
throw open wide their doors. And even if they 
were to reach agreement with the periphery on 
regulatory formulae, this could not be expected 
to resolve the external problem of our develop-
ment. A weighty reason for meditating upon the 
economic fractionalism of the periphery which 
we have been incapable of combating with vigour 
and resolution. 
In face of the above-mentioned facts and 
prospects, the periphery should give serious 
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thought to utilizing its own development poten-
tial, without neglecting on that account any posi-
tive action it can undertake in relation to the 
centres. As long as the latter do not succeed in 
rectifying their trend towards dynamic disequilib-
rium, the effort to expand exports of manufac-
tures will continue to be arduous, both because of 
the diminished rate of development of the cen-
tres and owing to their notorious restrictions. 
It is needless to point out the adverse effects 
of these facts on development. Their significance 
is twofoîd. In the first place, they contribute to 
the external bottleneck just as in the past, and 
perhaps even more intensively, since the exter-
nal imbalance also sets limits to genuine external 
financial co-operation. Secondly, the tempo of 
exports and the unfavourable terms of trade 
help to compress the surplus. And the combina-
tion of these two negative factors calls for radical 
changes in peripheral development in order to 
offset the twofold trend towards disequilibrium. 
To these structural factors are added the 
effects of certain conjunctural measures which 
are adopted in the centres in order to cope with 
the crisis of structural origin. I am referring 
mainly to the anti-inflationary policy of the lead-
ing dynamic centre. The recessive effects on the 
economy are common knowledge: contraction of 
employment and high interest rates. Undoubted-
ly a notable success has been scored in reducing 
inflation. We have already explained its huge 
cost, above all for the weaker elements in the 
social structure. But this cost is not confined to 
internal affairs. As has been pointed out by OECD, 
whose members are the great centres, one-third 
of the cost in question has fallen on the primary 
production countries.4 
It never rains but it pours. To our inflation-
ary crisis and its aggravation by the external fac-
tors cited, are superadded the effects of the 
conjunctural measures in question, which help to 
give greater impetus to inflationary pressure on 
the part of both the labour force and the State. 
And recourse is had to conventional measures to 
combat ills that are growing more serious every 
day. 
Obviously, the burden of the heavy service 
payments on the external debt worsens and com-
*See OECD, Economic Outlook, No. 32, Paris, 17 December 
1982, p. 8. 
plicates the ills in question. Not the.debtor coun-
tries alone but all are concerned, since they are 
obliged to follow internally the high interest rates 
prevailing in the centres, in order to contain the 
flight of capital. Even where an appropriate anti-
inflationary policy to succeed in reducing inter-
nal rates, those others will still be a stumbling-
block. A reactivation policy is difficult per se: even 
more so, if this unfavourable situation remains 
unchanged. 
The need for vigorous reactivation is widely 
felt in the Latin American region of the periph-
ery, especially in those countries which have pur-
sued a policy of constricting production in order 
to correct the structural external imbalance ac-
centuated by the above-mentioned conjunctural 
measures. The formula recommended from out-
side, and also advocated by local orthodoxy, is 
nothing new in Latin America: to abstain from 
artificial interference with imports and thus 
allow the play of market forces to re-establish 
equilibrium. 
This leads me to discuss another aspect of 
the crisis we are experiencing: the crisis of econom-
ic ideas. It is a serious and disquieting crisis 
which makes itself felt in a variety of ways. One is 
the persistence of conventional ideas in face of 
new phenomena which have arisen out of the 
changes in the structure of society. This happens 
both in the centres and in the Latin American 
region of the periphery. As far as the latter is 
particularly concerned, there has been a great 
retroversion towards theories which we had 
thought definitively left behind. Lastly, cases 
have arisen in which, on the pretext of restor-
ing conventional ideas, mistakes have been com-
mitted in their name through manipulating 
them with disastrous consequences. 
As regards the first instance, we need not 
expatiate on what we have already said of the 
dynamic disequilibrium whence new forms of 
inflation derive. The outdated formulas of mon-
etary policy involve counterproductive effects, 
and a huge economic and social cost, without 
correcting the structural factors to which the said 
disequilibrium is due. 
Both the centres and the periphery are slow 
to understand this, and cannot reconcile them-
selves to acknowledging the imperative necessity 
of changing the whole process of appropriation 
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of the surplus, of capital accumulation and of 
redistribution of the fruits of technical progress. 
Counterproductive use of the monetary in-
strument is commonly justified on the grounds 
that its purpose is to reinstate the market laws 
violated by the redistributive power of the labour 
force and the hypertrophy of the State. While the 
economic efficiency of these laws should not be 
overlooked, it is under their unrestricted rule 
that the structural phenomenon of the surplus 
emerges, from the appropriation of which ulti-
mately emanates the dynamic disequilibrium 
between expenditure and reproductive invest-
ment —the primary source of the new forms of 
inflation. 
The magic of the market had long been re-
nounced where the creation of money was con-
cerned. Experience had shown that it could not 
be left to the guidance of the profit incentive. 
Monetary regulation by the State through the 
central banks was then imposed. Kfficacious as 
was this macroecononuc regulation in former 
times, it now has to give place to other forms of 
regulation in order to prevent inflation. 
But what had happened in the international 
field is not exactly that these new forms are lack-
ing but that everything that was positive in mon-
etary regulation was thrown to the winds. Market 
laws had to be left to multiply the monetary re-
sources flowing from the leading dynamic centre 
and use them in pursuit of the profit incen-
tive. That would be the most advantageous al-
location of resources. All too well-known are 
the lamentable consequences of this lack of re-
gulation, which, it would seem, have not yet come 
to an end. 
Let us now pass on to the swingback to con-
ventional ideas that we thought had been discard-
ed once and for all in the Latin American re-
gion of the periphery. I am referring to what we 
had called the outdated pattern of the in-
ternational division of labour, which had left the 
periphery stranded on the edge of the tide of 
industrialization in the centres. It is not that this 
pattern was devoid of logic. Rather did it ignore 
significant structural differences between the pe-
riphery and the centres. These differences war-
ranted a carefully-thought-out industrialization 
policy envisaging import substitution first and 
exports of manufactures later. What this implied 
was not dispensing with market laws but estab-
lishing basic structural conditions which would 
make them dynamically efficacious in peripheral 
development. 
Now, the neoclassical theories on which that 
outdated pattern was based have broken out 
again in our countries and have spawned mea-
sures whose effects on industrialization have 
been deplorable. Unquestionably excesses and 
abuses in industrial development had to be set 
right. But that in no way rended it advisable to 
take rash steps of serious import which sought to 
justify an anachronistic retrogression. 
The centres, it is true, have sung the praises 
of this swingback which was preached in the 
name of old-fashioned economic theories. How 
can such ideological pertinacity be explain-
ed when even in times of long-drawn-out prospe-
rity the centres abstained from extending their 
liberalization to manufactures from the periph-
ery? What is more, how is it possible to justify the 
proliferation of new restrictive measures which 
set aside the principle of comparative advantages 
so strongly recommended to us by the centres? 
Lastly, I should like to make a few observa-
tions on certain ways in which conventional ideas 
have been manipulated in the periphery. 
One of these has been overvaluation of the 
currency, obstinacy in maintaining an exchange 
rate which did not follow the course of domestic 
inflation. The damage caused to industrial {and 
also in some cases agricultural) production has 
been considerable. Industries have been ruined 
by excessive external competition and in a brief 
space a tenacious effort to export manufactures 
has been virtually wiped out. 
Overvaluation has been invoked as a means 
of containing imports and, through lower prices, 
domestic inflation. But surely was this not one of 
the advantages of the gold standard? It is true 
that in the good old days of the gold standard the 
conjunctural expansion of imports entailed a de-
crease in monetary reserves and therefore a cor-
rection of inflationary expansion. But as far as I 
remember, this was never thought to be compati-
ble with the continuance of the fiscal deficit or 
other internal factors responsible for inflation. 
In former times the gold standard was an 
important element of relative monetary stability, 
and, despite its disappearance, some of the prin-
ciples it involved retain their validity. But it must 
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be acknowledged that in the Latin American re-
gion of the periphery its spontaneous operation 
intensified the external vulnerability of our econ-
omies. Experience gradually taught the advis-
ability of certain regulatory measures to preserve 
stability in face of external fluctuations. But as a 
result of the manipulation of certain principles, 
measures of this kind were abandoned, and the 
monetary market was left completely exposed to 
international vicissitudes. And the decision to do 
this was taken precisely when the aberrations of 
the Eurodollar market, to which we referred in 
section ii, had become notorious. This market 
was very far from affording a paradigm by which 
our monetary or financial policy ought to be 
inspired. Or, worse still, a paradigm that should 
lead us to do without a policy of our own, letting 
history repeat itself spontaneously through the 
play of international forces. Another lamentable 
case of manipulation of concepts! 
In our countries we had begun to think for 
ourselves, to sift the ideologies of the centres 
through the screen of our own experience. And 
also to recognize clearsightedly the shortcomings 
of our own development. T h e lessons of this 
crisis are highly important. They must be conned 
with dispassionate objectivity. We must set out 
anew on the path of our intellectual autonomy; 
and always bear in mind that the centres have 
shown interest in the development of the periph-
ery only when it suited their own economic, po-
litical or strategic interests. They have never 
been concerned with the underlying social 
depths of peripheral development. In short, it 
has been no concern of theirs that the periphery 
should cease to deserve that name. Let us em-
brace the conviction that such a change, whether 
in ideas or in facts, cannot come from outside. It 
must be our own work: a Latin American 
achievement, compatible, of course, with new 
forms of international co-operation and co-
existence. 
